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Abstract 
Non-existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly model is 
analyzed. The standard model is modified to include a list pricing stage and a subsequent price 
discounting stage. Both firms first simultaneously choose a maximum list price and then decide to 
lower the price, or not, in a subsequent discounting stage. List pricing works as a credible 
commitment device that induces the pure strategy outcome. It is shown that for a general class of 
rationing rules there exists a sub-game perfect equilibrium that involves both firms playing pure 
strategies. This equilibrium payoff dominates any other sub-game perfect equilibrium of the 
game. Further unlike the dominant firm interpretation of a price leader, we show that the small 
firm may have incentives to commit to a low price and in this sense assume the role of a leader. 
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1. Introduction
There has been a renewed interest in models where firms price subject to predetermined
capacity constraints (also known as Bertrand-Edgeworth models).1 The appeal of the
Bertrand-Edgeworth specification is that firms actually set prices assuming a very simple
technology that captures differences in firm size. Osborne and Pitchick (1986) and Allen
and Hellwig (1986b) argue that these models are a natural starting point for a theory of
firm behavior in oligopoly.
A common feature of Bertrand-Edgeworth models is the non-existence, in general, of
a pure strategy equilibrium. One way of avoiding this non-existence problem is the mixed
strategy solution concept,2 however, mixed strategies are not considered by some as a
satisfactory explanation of pricing behavior by firms. For example, Shubik and Levitan
(1980) consider mixed strategies as an “interesting extension of the equilibrium that is
somewhat hard to justify.” Dixon (1987) finds them “implausible” while Friedman (1988)
finds it “doubtful that the decision makers in firms shoot dice as an aid to selecting output
or price.”
The mixed strategy outcome is not particularly troublesome when the number of
firms in the industry is large. Allen and Hellwig (1986a) and Vives (1986) show, under
different assumptions on the rationing function, that as the number of firms in a Bertrand-
Edgeworth model grows the mixed strategy equilibrium converges in distribution to the
competitive equilibrium. In this sense, Allen and Hellwig (1986b), while considering the
non-existence of a pure strategy equilibrium a “drawback of the Bertrand-Edgeworth
specification,” argue that in the large numbers case randomization in prices is “in some
sense unimportant” as firms will set prices close to the competitive price with very high
probability. The competitive result is robust to a change in the equilibrium concept.
Dixon (1987) and Borgers (1992) obtain convergence to the competitive equilibrium us-
ing the -equilibrium and iterated elimination of dominated strategies solution concepts,
respectively.
When the number of firms in the industry is small, particularly in the paradigmatic
case of a duopoly, the previous approximation result does not apply. In this case the
1
Deneckere and Kovenock(1992) use such a model to explain price leadership in international trade;
Bjorsten (1994) uses it to analyze the effects of Voluntary Export Restraints; Iwand and Rosenbaum
(1991) and Staiger and Wolak (1992) use the Bertrand-Edgeworth specification to study the relationship
between prices and demand fluctuations in a dynamic model. Sorgard (1996) uses it to model a game of
entry in an industry with a dominant firm.
2
Maskin (1986) proves existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium for very general specifications of the
Bertrand-Edgeworth model.
alternatives to the mixed strategy solution have involved models that assume sequential
timing of firm moves. This is the approach that is followed in Shubik and Levitan (1980),
Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) (henceforth DK), and Canoy (1996).
The paper closest to ours is that of DK (1992). DK analyze a price leadership model
in a duopolistic market where the firms choose the timing of their price announcements,
maximizing total discounted profits. They show that under efficient rationing, and when
capacities are in the range where the simultaneous move game yields a mixed-strategy
solution, the high capacity firm becomes a price leader. In their game, prices, once
announced, cannot be changed. Firm 1 announces its price at the beginning of an even
index while firm 2 announce its price at the beggining of an odd index. Given that both
firms cannot choose prices in the same index, the timing choice in this sense is exogenous
in their game. It should be, however, noted that they do not impose Stackelberg leader-
follower roles beforehand.
Our paper provides an alternative to the sequential timing hypothesis by analyzing
a natural extension of a Bertrand-Edgeworth model for which pure strategy equilibrium
always exists. We consider a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly model where prices are deter-
mined simultaneously in two stages. In the first stage, both firms announce list prices si-
multaneously. In the second stage firms may discount from these list prices. In this sense
prices are ex post (downward) flexible in our model. Under quite general assumptions
about the rationing mechanism we show that there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium
in which both firms play pure strategies and that this equilibrium payoff dominates any
other subgame perfect equilibrium.
The motivation behind this two stage pricing structure is taken from list pricing3.
List pricing is a widely extended trading institution where firms post prices for some
period of time. These prices can then later be discounted. Our model does not provide
an alternative solution concept to the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium but it yields the
prediction that randomization by firms is not equilibrium behavior and it does so with a
straightforward extension of the classical model. Further, we generalize some of the results
of the Bertrand-Edgeworth literature which were only known to hold for the classical one
stage pricing game.
The intuition behind our result is simple. In a Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium a firm
may set a price such that its rival obtains higher profits from selling to the residual demand
(than from setting some undercutting price). This price gives the rival a monopoly on
the residual demand. By committing to a low list price a firm signals to its rival that
3
Posting a maximum list price and later offering discounts is common practice in most retail markets.
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it can act as a monopolist on the residual demand in the subsequent discounting stage.
In this sense the list pricing institution acts as a facilitating collusion device between
the firms4. There are some examples that suggest the empirical relevance of this type of
pricing behavior in concentrated industries with a single dominant firm (see for instance
Sorgard (1995)).
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we present the basic model of a price
setting duopoly with capacity constraints and specify a general residual demand function.
In Section 3 we define the Edgeworth Price. This is useful for characterizing the pure
and mixed strategy equilibria that arise in the game. In Section 4 we analyze the pricing
equilibria of our list-pricing game and compare it to the equilibrium of the single stage
pricing game. In Section 5 we explore the relationship between list pricing and price
leadership. Section 6 concludes.
2. Residual Demand in a Bertrand-Edgeworth Duopoly
The classical Bertrand-Edgeworth game involves two stages, in the first stage (the produc-
tion stage) firms simultaneously set capacities and in the second stage they simultaneously
decide upon prices. Once prices are announced market demand is distributed between
the firms according to some specified rationing rule which represents underlying consumer
behavior and is assumed to be either efficient, or proportional.5
Consider a market with 2 firms that produce a homogenous good. The firms in the
market face capacity restrictions 0 < k
i
≤ D(0) and have zero costs. Suppose that the
aggregate market demand, D(p), is continuous and results in a strictly concave revenue
curve, pD(p). Suppose that D(p) is positive downward sloping and twice differentiable
on (0, p0) and zero for p ≥ p0 > 0. Let P (q) denote the inverse demand function.
Associated with the demand function and firm capacity we can define a firm´s monopoly
price pM
i
= argmax pmin(D(p), k
i
).
Given a vector of prices p ∈ 2
+
set by the firms we now discuss what firm i sells in
the market.
4
In a different context Holt and Scheffman (1988) analyze list pricing as a facilitating practice device.
5
Efficient rationing also refered to as “surplus maximizing” and is used in Levitan and Shubik (1972),
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), Vives (1986), and Deneckre and Kovenock (1992). Proportional rationing
is used in Beckman(1965), Allen and Hellwig (1986a-b), Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), Davidson and
Deneckre (1986) (this last paper also has some results for a general class of rationing functions) and
Deneckre and Kovenock (1992).
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Where, R(p
i,
p
j
, k
j
) represents a general residual (or contingent demand) function, and is
defined only for p
i
≥ p
j
. The residual demand function is determined by how the rationing
of excess demand is modeled.
The Bertrand-Edgeworth literature has used one of two specifications of residual de-
mand: proportional or efficient. To understand how they work we will suppose that
consumers have a unitary demand, that firm j undercuts firm i, p
i
> p
j
, and that firm j
cannot meet all its demand, D(p
j
) > k
j
. The proportional (or Beckman) residual demand
specification results from the hypothesis that each potential consumer of firm j has an
equal probability of being served. The residual demand facing the high priced firm is then
given by,
R
B
(p
i,
p
j
, k
j
) = max(D(p
i
)(1−
k
j
D(p
j
)
), 0)
The efficient, or surplus maximizing, residual demand specification assumes that low
priced goods are allocated to consumers with the highest valuation for the good.6 Under
this assumption the high priced firm has residual demand,
R
E
(p
i,
p
j
, k
j
) = max(D(p
i
)− k
j
, 0)
Proportional and efficient rationing are but two of the many reasonable specifications
of residual demand. For instance one may assume that a proportion 1−λ(> 0) of the low
priced firm’s capacity is allocated randomly among potential buyers while the remaining
capacity goes to unsatisfied high valuation consumers, this would result in residual demand
for the high priced firm of,
R
λ
(p
i,
p
j
, k
j
) = max(λ(D(p
i
)− k
j
) + (1− λ)D(p
i
)(1−
k
j
D(p
j
)
), 0).
This function belongs to a class of residual demand functions for which our results
hold. This class can be characterized by imposing the following restrictions on function
R(p
i,
p
j
, k
j
) : A→ 
+
where, A = {(p, p′, k′) ∈ 3 : p ≥ p′ ≥ 0, k′ ≥ 0}
6
It should be noted that although efficient rationing maximizes consumer surplus (for a particular
capacity constrained firm), it does not maximize total consumer surplus. Given capacities and prices,
if the high priced firm can meet all it´s residual demand proportional rationing leads to greater total
consumer and total surplus than efficient rationing.
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1. R(p
i,
p
j
, k
j
) is continuous.
2. When R(p
i,
p
j
, k
j
) > 0, it is strictly decreasing in p
i
.
3. When R(p
i,
p
j
, k
j
) > 0 then R(p
i,
p
j
, k
j
)p
i
is strictly concave in p
i
.
4. max(0, D(p
i
)− k
j
) ≤ R(p
i,
p
j
, k
j
) ≤ max(0,min(D(p
j
)− k
j
, D(p
i
))).
5. When R(p
i,
p
j
, k
j
) > 0 it is strictly decreasing in p
j
.
Properties (1),(2) and (3) guarantee that the residual demand function inherits certain
regularity properties from the demand function. In order to understand property (4)
consider what happens as p
j
gets arbitrarily close to p
i
. In this case the number of
consumers of the low priced firm with a reservation price below p
i
becomes arbitrarily
small and the residual demand function is D(p
i
)− k
j
. With respect to the left hand side
simply note that the low priced firm may never sell more that k
j
units of the good.7
Property (5) refers to the fact that if firm j (the low price firm) lowers its price, p
j
,
more consumers enter the market and this reduces the amount of firm j ′s output that
is allocated to high valuation consumers. This in turn increases residual demand for the
high price firm i. Thus firm i’s profits will rise as firm j lowers its price. The effect of
firm j lowering its price on profits of firm i plays an important role in our results.
Further, it must be noted that the efficient residual demand is not included in the
class of rationing functions we consider since it violates property (5). On the other hand
our results do hold for functions that approximate efficient residual demand (ver small λ)
as R
λ
(p
i,
p
j
, k
j
) verifies properties 1-5 for any 0 ≤ λ < 1.
3. The Lower Bound of the Edgeworth Cycle
In a Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium a firm i may set a price such that its rival obtains
higher profits from selling to the residual demand than from setting an undercutting price.
We refer to the highest of such prices as the Edgeworth price, pE
i
(it is the lower bound of
the Edgeworth cycle). The Edgeworth Price will be very useful in order to characterize
the equilibria that arise in the pricing subgames that we study. If firm i sets a price
greater than firm j’s monopoly price (pM
j
) it will surely be undercut, i.e., pE
i
≤ pM
j
.
Let us denote the price firm i sets to serve the residual demand by pR(p
j
, k
j
) (given
that firm j chooses p
j
). Then,
7
Properties (1), (2) and (4) are proposed by Davidson and Deneckre (1986) for a “reasonable rationing
function.”
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pR(p
j
, k
j
) = arg max
x∈[p
j
,p
0
]
R(x, p
j
, k
j
)x.
If firm i sets a price, p
i
, such that (the competitive price) P (k
1
+k
2
) ≤ p
i
< pM
j
then the
maximum profits that firm j obtains by setting a price p′ less than p
i
are bounded above
and arbitrarily close to min(k
j
,D(p′)p′). On the other hand the maximum profits that
firm j obtains from acting on the residual demand is given by R(pR(p
i
, k
i
), p
i
, k
i
)pR(p
i
, k
i
).
This leads to our next result.
Theorem 3.1. pE
i
can be characterized by the unique price p that verifies,
min(k
j
, D(p))p = R(pR(p, k
i
), p, k
i
)pR(p, k
i
).
Proof: We first prove that there is a unique p that verifies the equation. For p ∈
[P (k
1
+k
2
), pM
j
] the left hand side of the equation is strictly increasing and continuous
and that the right hand side is decreasing (property 5) and continuous (property 1
and the Maximum Theorem). We have then that if the two functions cross they cross
only once. We now prove that the two functions actually cross on [P (k
1
+ k
2
), pM
j
].
First note that if firm i sets a price, P (k
i
), (it has capacity enough to serve demand)
then firm j will have incentives to undercut this price,
P (k
i
)min(k
−i
, k
i
) ≥ max
x∈[P (k
i
),p
0
]
R(x, P (k
i
), k
i
)x
This is true since the left hand is positive and the right hand side is zero by the
property (4) of residual demand. On the other hand if firm i sets the competitive
price firm j will have no incentives to undercut it,
P (k
1
+ k
2
)k
−i
≤ max
x∈[P (k
1
+k
2
),p
0
]
R(x, P (k
1
+ k
2
), k
i
)x
This is true since the left hand side evaluated at p = P (k
1
+k
2
) is equal to the right
hand side (by property (4) of residual demand).
Let us now denote the unique price that verifies the equality by pˆ. If firm i
sets a price, p
i
, such that pM
j
> p
i
> pˆ firm j will have incentives to undercut this
price. On the other hand if firm i sets a price of pˆ the profits firm j may gain from
undercutting firm i (setting a price below pˆ) are strictly less than min(k
j
, D(pˆ))pˆ,
and acting on the residual demand as a monopolist will give it profits of exactly
min(k
j
,D(pˆ))pˆ.

6
For the sake of convenience we will index two firms such that firm 1 has a higher Edge-
worth price than firm 2, pE
1
≥ pE
2
. Note that further assumptions on the residual demand
function would be needed to determine which firm will have the highest Edgeworth price
although it is straightforward to see that if the residual demand function is of the type
R
λ
then there is a direct relation between the Edgeworth price and firm capacity where
k
i
≥ k
j
implies pE
i
≤ pE
j
. That is, the low capacity firm has a higher Edgeworth price
than the high capacity firm.
4. The List Pricing Game
In the classical Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly model firms are assumed to set prices simul-
taneously. In our extension of the classical model the price setting process is modeled in
two stages. In the first stage each firm i ∈ {1, 2} sets a list price pL
i
, and in the second
stage firms are allowed to offer a discount on the list price. Given the discounted price pd
i
(≤ pL
i
) consumers make their purchasing decisions according to q
i
(pd
i
, pd
j
). For simplicity
we do not consider list prices greater than p0
i
.We refer to this extended model as the list
pricing game. This game reflects the list pricing institution, also referred to as posted
offer, that is prevalent in many industries.
In this section we prove that there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium to the list
pricing game that involves no mixed strategies on the equilibrium path and we characterize
this equilibrium. Furthermore we prove that if there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium
that yields an outcome that is different from the proposed equilibrium the former is payoff
dominated by the latter. If any preplay communication exists between the players then
it could be argued that this dominating equilibrium would be chosen, in this sense the
equilibrium that we propose is a focal point of the list pricing game.
4.1. The Discounting Subgame
We first verify the existence of an equilibrium to each discounting subgame given any
pair of price ceilings pL
i
≥ 0. The proof is a straightforward application of Theorem 5 in
Dasgupta and Maskin (1986a).
Theorem 4.1. The discounting subgame has a (mixed) Nash equilibrium for any (pL
1
, pL
2
).
Proof: Note that each firm’s action space [0, pL
i
] is a closed interval and the profit
(payoff) function of each firm,
π
i
(p
i
, p
j
) = p
i
q
i
(p
i
, p
j
)
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is continuous except on a subset of
A∗(i) = {(p
i
, p
j
) ∈ [0, pL
i
]× [0, pL
j
]|p
i
= p
j
}
By proving that i) π
1
(p
1
, p
2
)+π
2
(p
2
, p
1
) is continuous and ii) that π
i
(p
1
, p
2
) is weakly
lower semi-continuous we may apply Dasgupta and Maskin (1986a) to obtain the
desired existence result.
i) The only possible discontinuity of π
1
(p
1
, p
2
) + π
2
(p
2
, p
1
) occurs in when p
1
=
p
2
≥ P (k
1
+ k
2
). Consider a series of prices (p
it
, p
jt
)→ (p∗
,
p∗) we then have
D(p
t
) ≤ q
i
(p
ij
, p
jt
) + q
j
(p
jt
, p
it
) ≤ D(p
t
)
where p
t
∈ max
i
p
it
and p
t
∈ min
i
p
it
.Now let (t) = p
t
− p
t
we may then write
D(p
t
+ (t))(p
t
− (t)) ≤ q
i
(p
ij
, p
jt
) + q
j
(p
jt
, p
it
)
≤ D(p
t
− (t))(p
t
+ (t))
finally by taking limits we obtain
D(p∗)p∗ ≤ π
1
(p∗, p∗) + π
2
(p∗, p∗) ≤ D(p∗)p∗
which proves the desired continuity result.
ii) In order to prove weak lower semi-continuity for p > P (k
1
+ k
2
) note that for
any p∗
lim
p→¯p
∗
inf π
i
(p, p∗) = min(k
i
,D(p∗))p∗
≥ π
i
(p∗, p∗) = min(k
i
,
k
i
k
1
+ k
2
D(p∗))p∗

We first consider the possibility of reaching a discounting subgame where the list prices
induce a pure strategy equilibrium. A well known result of the Bertrand-Edgeworth
literature is that the only candidate for a pure strategy equilibrium is the competitive
price (see Arrow (1951) in Canoy). The condition under which the Arrow result applies
in our model is discussed in Theorem 3. We show later that this condition is never met in
equilibrium unless the classis Bertrand-Edgeworth game has a pure strategy equilibrium.
A pure strategy equilibrium that does not involve the competitive price can always be
induced in the discounting stage if firm i sets its list price equal to the competitive price
8
(and firm j sets a list price that is high enough). In fact any pair of list prices pL
i
> pL
j
such that firm i will act on the residual demand if firm j sets a list price of pL
j
,
min(D(pL
j
), k
i
)pL
j
≤ max
p∈[p
L
j
,p
i
L
]
R(p, pL
j
, k
j
)p
induce a pure strategy equilibrium in the discounting stage, (pˆd
i
, pˆd
j
), where firm j does
not discount its list price and firm i acts on the residual demand setting a discounted
price of
pˆd
i
= arg max
p∈[p
L
j
,p
i
L
]
R(p, pL
j
, k
j
)p
Theorem 3 Let pL
i
≥ pL
j
, if
min(D(pL
j
), k
i
)pL
j
> max
p∈[p
L
j
,p
i
L
]
R(p, pL
j
, k
j
)p
the only candidate for a pure strategy equilibrium involves both firms setting the
competitive price.
Proof: Suppose a pure strategy equilibrium to the discounting game, (pˆd
1
, pˆd
2
), exists. If
pˆd
i
< pˆd
j
, this implies that pˆd
i
= pL
i
or else firm i would want to raise its price, which
contradicts pL
i
≥ pL
j
. Suppose on the other hand pˆd
j
< pˆd
i
, this implies pˆd
j
= pL
j
.
Further, in order for firm i to not have incentives to undercut firm j it must be the
case that
min(D(pL
j
), k
i
)pL
j
≤ max
p∈[p
L
j
,p
i
L
]
R(p, pL
j
, k
j
)p
which leads to contradiction. We have then that both firms set the same discounted
price. However, if both firms set the same discounted price, it must be the case that
the equilibrium is competitive (or else at least one firm will have an incentive to
undercut its rival).

We now consider the possibility of reaching a subgame where list prices induce a
non-degenerate mixed strategy equilibrium. Given the list prices set in the first stage
(pL
1
, pL
2
) a firm’s strategy in the discounting subgame is defined by a (possibly degenerate)
probability measure µd
i
on [0, pL
i
]. Let the minimum and the maximum of the support
of µd
i
be denoted by p
i
and p
i
respectively. Given any two strategies (µd
i
, µd
j
) a firm´s
expected profits in discounting stage will be denoted by π
i
(µd
i
, µd
j
).
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The next result characterizes some of the properties of a non-degenerate mixed strategy
equilibrium in the discounting stage. Property i) shows that the lower bound of the price
support is the same for both firms and that it is above the market clearing price. Property
ii) shows that if pd is greater than the competitive price then firms have no atoms at pd.
One of the implications of this is that both firms have non degenerate mixed strategies
in equilibrium. Property iii) implies that there is a firm h that when setting the highest
price in its support will be undercut with certainty. It should be noted that a discounting
subgame where the list prices are set at p0 is equivalent to the classical one stage pricing
game. This theorem thus generalizes some of the results of the Bertrand-Edgeworth
literature which are known to hold in the case of the efficient and proportional residual
demands for a more general class of residual demand functions.
Theorem 4 Given (pL
1
> 0, pL
2
> 0) if a nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibrium,
(µd
1
, µd
2
), to the discounting subgame exists:
i) pd
1
= pd
2
= pd
ii) π
i
(µd
i
, µd
j
) = min(D(pd), k
i
)pd for any i ∈ {1, 2}
iii) for one of the two firms h ∈ {1, 2}:
π
h
(µd
h
, µd
−h
) =
∫
p
d
−h
p
d
R(pd
h
, p, k
−h
)pd
h
dµd
−h
(p)
Proof: See Appendix

As a corollary to Theorem 1 we will prove that the lower bound of the support of
the mixed strategy equilibrium is below the Edgeworth price of firm 1. This result is
important since it implies that firm 1 would be better off if it could commit to a price
of pE
1
and have firm 2 act on the residual demand than in any discounting game that
has a non-degenerate mixed strategy equilibrium. The proof is based on the fact that by
Theorem 2 in a mixed strategy equilibrium there is a firm h which sets a price of pd
h
and
is undercut by its rival with certainty. Firm h′s payoffs when setting this price are not
certain, they are greatest when its rival sets a price of pd, thus expected profits of firm
h are strictly less than R(pd
h
, pd, k
−h
)pd
h
. Thus if firm −h were to set a price sufficiently
close to pd with certainty, firm h would best respond acting on the residual demand. This
in turn implies the Edgeworth price of firm h must be greater than pd.
10
Corollary 1 Given (pL
1
> 0, pL
2
> 0) if a non-degenerate mixed strategy equilibrium to
the discounting game exists then pd < pE
1
Proof: By Theorem 4 there is a firm h for which
min(D(pd), k
h
)pd =
∫
p
d
−h
p
d
R(pd
h
, p, k
−h
)pd
h
dµ
−h
(p)
given the continuity of the residual demand function by the Mean Value Theorem
we have that ∫
p
d
−h
p
d
R(pd
h
, p, k
−h
)pd
h
dµ
−h
(p) = R(pd
h
, z, k
−h
)pd
h
for some pd < z < pd
−h
. By Property (5) of residual demand we have
min(D(pd), k
h
)pd < R(pd
h
, pd, k
−h
)pd
h
which along with pE
i
≤ pE
1
gives us the desired result.

4.2. The Full Game
We now characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium of the list pricing game. Our first
result is that if the Edgeworth price of both firms coincides with competitive price then
any subgame perfect equilibrium of the list pricing game involves both firms setting the
competitive price.
Theorem 5 If pE
1
= P (k
1
+k
2
), any subgame perfect equilibrium of the list pricing game
involves both firms setting a discounted price of P (k
1
+ k
2
).
Proof: Note that a firm i can always guarantee itself profits of P (k
1
+k
2
)k
i
by setting the
competitive price in the list pricing stage and in the discounting stage, this implies
that any list price below the competitive price is strictly dominated. For this reason
in a subgame perfect equilibrium no firm will set a price below P (k
1
+ k
2
).
We now prove that if a firm j sets a price of P (k
1
+ k
2
) in the discounting stage
the best response of firm i is to set a price of P (k
1
+k
2
). Given that pE
j
= P (k
1
+k
2
)
we have that
k
i
P (k
1
+ k
2
) = max
p∈[P (k
1
+k
2
),p
0
]
R(p, P (k
1
+ k
2
), k
j
)p
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Furthermore by property (4) of the residual demand
k
i
P (k
1
+ k
2
) = R(P (k
1
+ k
2
), P (k
1
+ k
2
), k
j
)P (k
1
+ k
2
)
This along with property (3) yields
k
i
P (k
1
+ k
2
) > R(p, P (k
1
+ k
2
), k
j
)p
for any p > P (k
1
+ k
2
), which proves the desired result.
This proves that setting the competitive price is an equilibrium. To prove unique-
ness note that if pL
i
= P (k
1
+k
2
) for some firm i, then firm iwill set the competitive
price in the discounting stage and by the previous argument firm j will best respond
by setting the competitive price. If on the other hand pL
i
> P (k
1
+k
2
) for both firms
by Corollary 1 no nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibrium will exist.

The intuition behind the result is that if both firms set the competitive price no firm
has an incentive to raise its price since the characterization of the Edgeworth price implies
P (k
1
+ k
2
)k
i
= max
p
′
∈[p
j
,p
0
]
R(p′, P (k
1
+ k
2
), k
j
)p. To see that this is the only possible
equilibrium note that by Corollary 1 when pE
1
= P (k
1
+k
2
) and pL
i
≥ P (k
1
+k
2
), for some
i, a mixed strategy equilibrium to the discounting subgame does not exist.
Since the Bertrand-Edgeworth pricing game can be seen as a discounting game where
the list prices are set arbitrarily high it is clear that by Theorem 5 if pE
1
= P (k
1
+ k
2
)
the Bertrand-Edgeworth model has a pure strategy equilibrium. On the other hand
by Theorem 3 we have that the only candidate for a pure strategy equilibrium in a
Bertrand-Edgeworth model is the competitive price, but if pE
1
> P (k
1
+ k
2
) firm 2 will
have an incentive to deviate from this equilibrium. This leads to our next result which
characterizes when the one stage pricing game has a pure strategy equilibrium.
Corollary 2 The Bertrand-Edgeworth model has a pure strategy equilibrium iff pE
1
=
pE
2
= P (k
1
+ k
2
)
Theorem 5 and Corollary 2 imply that when the Bertrand-Edgeworth model has a pure
strategy equilibrium the addition of a list pricing stage is innocuous in the sense that it
leads to the same prices in equilibrium. We will now deal with the case of characterizing
the equilibria of the list pricing game when a pure strategy equilibrium of the Bertrand-
Edgeworth game does not exist.
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In the following theorem we prove the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium of the
list pricing game in which firms play pure strategies. In this subgame perfect equilibrium,
which we denote by e∗, firm 1 sets its list price equal to pE
1
and does not discount, while
firm 2 sets its list price arbitrarily high and acts as a monopolist on the residual demand
in the discounting stage.
Theorem 6 (pL
1
= pd
1
= pE
1
, pL
2
≥ pM(pE
1
, k
1
) = pd
2
) is a subgame perfect equilibrium of
the list pricing game.
Proof: If pE
2
= P (k
1
+ k
2
) this implies that pE
1
= P (k
1
+ k
2
) and we obtain the desired
result by applying Theorem 5. Suppose on the other hand that pE
2
> P (k
1
+ k
2
). In
this case the proposed equilibrium yields the following profits:
π∗
1
= min(k
2
, D(pE
1
))pE
1
π∗
2
= R(pR(pE
1
, k
1
), pE
1
, k
1
)pR(pE
1
, k
1
) = min(k
2
,D(pE
1
))pE
1
Let us suppose firm i has a profitable deviation. It must involve setting a list price
greater than pE
i
. Corrolary 2 implies that the there is no pure strategy equilibrium.
Given that an equlibrium exists it must be a mixed strategy equilibrium (µ
i
, µ
j
).
Let us denote the expected profits in this equilibrium by (π
i
, π
j
). From Theorem 4
we have that for some firm h ∈ {1, 2}
π
h
=
∫
p
d
−h
p
d
R(pd
h
, p, k
−h
)pd
h
dµ
−h
(p)
Applying the mean value theorem and given the fact that the equilibrium is
nondegenerate we obtain that for some p′ ∈ (pd, pd
h
) ,
π
h
= R(pd
h
, p′, k
−h
)pd
h
Thus by property (5) of residual demand
π
h
< R(pd
h
, pd, k
−h
)pd
h
this in turn implies that pd < pE
h
and therefore pMIN < pE
h
< pE
1
. This along with
the fact that π
i
= min(D(pMIN), k
i
)pMIN proves that π∗
i
> π
i
.

We now prove that any subgame perfect equilibrium that does not lead to the same
price outcome as e∗ leads to lower expected payoffs for both firms. This property makes
it a clear focal point of the list pricing game e∗, furthermore if there is any pre-play
communication firms would coordinate to this equilibrium.
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Theorem 7 Any subgame perfect equilibrium of the list pricing game that does not
result in prices of pE
1
and pM(pE
1
, k
1
) leads to lower expected profits for both firms.
Proof: If pE
1
= P (k
1
+k
2
) then from Theorem 5 we have that e∗ is the unique equilibrium.
Suppose on the other hand that pE
1
> P (k
1
+k
2
) and that there exists an equilibrium
ê that leads to an expected payoff of π̂
i
, where π̂
i
> π∗
i
for at least one i ∈ {1, 2}.
We will denote the lower bound of the list price support of a firm i in ê by pL
i
. We
first note that if this equilibrium is not to be dominated for both firms it must be
the case that pL
i
≥ pE
1
for some firm i. Without loss of generality we assume that
pL
i
≥ pL
j
. We will characterize the expected payoff of ê by the expected payoff of a
discounting game where the list prices are given by (pL
i
, pL
j
), for any pL
i
≥ pL
j
. It
cannot be the case that
min(D(pL
j
), k
i
)pL
j
< max
p∈[p
L
j
,p
i
L
]
R(p, pL
j
, k
j
)p
since strategy pL
j
is dominated by pL
j
+  for any  > 0 for which
min(D(pL
j
+ ), k
i
)pL
j
+  < max
p∈[p
L
j
,p
i
L
]
R(p, pL
j
, k
j
)p
It must then be the case that
min(D(pL
j
), k
i
)pL
j
≥ max
p∈[p
L
j
,p
i
L
]
R(p, pL
j
, k
j
)p
For any pair (pL
i
, pL
j
) for which
min(D(pL
j
), k
i
)pL
j
> max
p∈[p
L
j
,p
i
L
]
R(p, pL
j
, k
j
)p
the discounting subgame will either have a nondegenerate mixed strategy equilib-
rium and by Corollary 1 π̂
i
> π∗
i
or a pure strategy equilibrium and by Theorem 5
will result in competitive prices, thus π̂
i
> π∗
i
. It must be the case that for all but
a subset of measure zero of the list price pairs played (pL
i
, pL
j
),
min(D(pL
j
), k
i
)pL
j
= max
p∈[p
L
j
,p
i
L
]
R(p, pL
j
, k
j
)p
Note that for this inequality to hold it must be the case that pL
j
≤ pE
1
. If pL
j
< pE
1
then π̂
i
> π∗
i
. Thus it must be the case that pL
j
= pE
1
and thus pL
i
≥ pM(pE
1
, k
j
)
which implies that all but a measure zero of the price outcomes in ê are given by
pd
1
= pE
1
and pd
2
= pM(pE
1
, k
1
).
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A similar equilibrium outcome as in e∗ is obtained in Gelman and Salop(1983). They
analyze a game of entry in a market by a capacity constrained firm, where the entrant must
commit to a price to which the incumbent best responds. Note, Gelman and Salop (1983)
refer to the entrants low price (small size) strategy as “judo economics”. In our model
the low pricing strategy is followed by the firm with the highest Edgeworth price, without
any additional assumptions on the residual demand function it is not straightforward to
prove a direct relation between the low price strategy and size. If we assume that residual
demand is given by R
λ
(p
i,
p
j
, k
j
) for any λ < 1 then it is straightforward to prove that
k
i
< k
j
implies pE
i
> pE
j
, that is the small firm will follow the low pricing strategy. There
are several examples of the empirical validity of this type of “judo economics” pricing
behavior which are given in Gelman and Salop (1983), and Sorgard (1995).
5. List Pricing and Price Leadership
Price leadership has been studied in the literature with endogenous determination of the
timing of the moves, i.e., whether a firm prefers to act as a leader, or as a follower. In
these models, once a firm sets its price it cannot be changed regardless of how the rival
responds. Even though ex-post it would be in the leader’s interest to change its price none
of the papers explain the strong nature of this commitment. In this section we argue that
list pricing may provide such a credible commitment mechanism in which price outcomes
emerge that are similar to price leadership.
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) propose a two stage framework to endogenize the timing
of a duopoly game where each firm chooses a strategy (which could be price or quantity).
Firms may choose their strategy in period 1 or wait till period 2. If a firm chooses
a strategy in the first period and the other firm waits it is informed of the strategy
chosen by its rival. In another paper van Damme and Hurkens (1996) show that playing
simultaneously is subgame perfect in the Hamilton-Slutsky timing game only if none of
the players has an incentive to move first.
We will now show that the sub-game perfect equilibria of our list pricing game is a sub-
game perfect equilibria in the endogenous timing framework proposed by Hamilton and
Slutsky. In order to obtain our equivalence result it suffices to prove that in the Bertrand-
Edgeworth game that we analyze the mixed strategy equilibria is indeed dominated by a
sequential game where firm 2 moves first.
Theorem 8 When no pure strategy equilibrium of the Bertrand-Edgeworth game exists
15
firm 2 has an incentive to move first.
Proof: By Theorem 4 and Corollary 1 in any mixed strategy equilibrium of the discount-
ing game (including the case where list prices are set arbitrarily high) the expected
payoff of firm 2 is given by pdmin(D(pd), k
2
) for some pd < pE
2
.
On the other hand if firm 2 moves first and sets a price of pE
2
then firm 1 will set
pM(pE
2
, k
2
) and firm 2 will obtain profits of pE
2
min(D(pE
2
), k
2
).

We then have that the subgame perfect equilibria involves one firm moving first. We
will now prove that in Hamilton and Slutsky timing game if firm i moves first it will set
its Edgeworth price.
Theorem 9 When no pure strategy equilibrium of the Bertrand-Edgeworth game exists
if firm i moves first it will set a price of pE
i
.
Proof: Suppose firm i is moving first. If it sets a price above pE
i
it will be undercut
by firm j in the second stage and its profits will be bounded by πˆ
i
= (D(pˆ)− k
j
)pˆ
where
pˆ = argmax
p
(D(p)− k
j
)p
By Theorem 4 if firm i deviates to simultaneous play in the second stage it will
obtain expected profits of πs
i
= pmin(D(p), k
i
). We will now prove that πˆ
i
< πs
i
.
Suppose on the other hand πˆ
i
≥ πs
i
, it must be the case that pˆ > p. Suppose
that firm i deviates from its mixed strategy and sets a price of pˆ. Given that the
equilibrium is nondegenerate µ
j
([p, pˆ)) > 0. The payoffs of firm i from this deviation
will be bounded below by R(pˆ, p′, k
j
)pˆ where p′ ∈ [p, pˆ).By properties 4 and 5 of the
residual demand function
R(pˆ, p′, k
j
)pˆ > (D(pˆ)− k
j
)pˆ
thus πˆ
i
< πs
i
. From this we may conclude that if firm i moves first it will choose a
price less than or equal to pE
i
. Given that for firm i any price below pE
i
is dominated
by pE
i
we obtain the desired result.

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Finally, it is straightforward to see that given pE
2
> pE
1
if there exists a subgame
perfect equilibrium where firm 1 leads it is dominated for both firms by the equilibrium
where firm 2 leads.8 We have then proved that in our model the sequential-timing and
list-pricing solutions to the nonexistence of a pure strategy equilibria are equivalent. The
difference is that while in the sequential-timing models firms are not allowed to change
their price (once it is chosen), in our list pricing approach firms can discount. Our result
is obtained under a weaker assumption that reflects a pricing institution that is prevalent
in many markets.
6. Conclusion
The mixed strategy equilibrium result in Bertrand-Edgeworth models has been criticized
as an unsatisfactory explanation of firm pricing behavior in oligopolistic markets. Sev-
eral authors have addressed the non-existence issue. When the number of firms in the
industry is arbitrarily large Allen and Hellwig (1986a), Vives (1986), Borgers (1986) and
Dixon (1986) show that the mixed strategy equilibrium outcome approximates the pure
strategy competitive equilibrium. Hence, as pointed out by Allen and Hellwig (1986b)
the nonexistence issue is “in some sense unimportant”.
For the duopoly case Shubik and Levitan (1980), DK, and Canoy (1996) avoid the
non-existence problem by imposing a sequential timing structure in firm pricing moves.
Thus one of the two firms must commit to a price which cannot be changed when its rival
best responds. Given that the price leader will ex-ante have an incentive to change its
price commitment has to be credible. In our paper adding list pricing into the standard
Bertrand-Edgeworth model makes commitment credible and we obtain a pure strategy
outcome.
As in DK, in our paper also capacities determine the leader. However, unlike DK the
small firm emerges as the leader in our structure. Further, in DK Stackelberg leadership
prices outcomes are more collusive than the simoultaneous move setting. We get a similar
result, however, our result arises from a simoultaneous move two period list pricing game
without discounting. Finally, as in DK in our paper we have a deterministic price solution.
In our equilibrium one of the firms commits to a low price signalling to its rival that it
can act as a monopolist on the residual demand. Our result suggests that the traditional
one-stage pricing Bertrand-Edgeworth models may overstate the competitiveness of an
oligopolistic industry (DK make a similar point). Credible commitment to price by a firm
8
It should be noted that when residual demand takes on the form of R
λ
our results imply that the
smallest firm will adopt a “leadership” role.
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can enforce a pure strategy outcome. Further, an interesting result arising from our paper
is that in many cases it is in the interest of the small firm to commit credibly and choose
its price first. In this sense, unlike the general interpretation, the “leadership” role (i.e.
first mover) is assumed by the smaller firm.
18
References
[1] Allen, B. and M. Hellwig, (1986a), “Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopoly in Large Mar-
kets,” Review of Economic Studies, 53, 175-204.
[2] Allen, B. and M. Hellwig ,(1986b), “Price-Setting Firms and the Oligopolistic Foun-
dations of Perfect Competition,” AEA Papers and Proceedings, 76, 387-392.
[3] Beckmann, M., “Edgeworth-Bertrand Duopoly Revisited,” in R. Henn, eds, Opera-
tions Research-Verfahren, III, Meisenheim: Verlag Anton Hein, 1965, pp. 55-68.
[4] Bjorksten, N., (1994), “Voluntary Import Expansions and Voluntary Import Re-
straints in an Oligopoly Model with Capacity Constraints,” Canadian Journal of
Economics, 2, 446-457.
[5] Borgers, T., (1992), “Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies in a Bertrand-
Edgeworth Model,” Review of Economic Studies, 59, 163-176.
[6] Canoy, M., (1996), “Heterogenous Goods in a Bertrand-Edgeworth Duopoly,” Jour-
nal of Economic Theory, 70, 158-179.
[7] van Damme, E. and Hurkens, S., (1996), ”Commitment Robust Equilibria and En-
dogenous Timing,” Games and Economic Behaviour, 15 (2), 290-311.
[8] Dasgupta, P. and E. Maskin, (1986), “The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous
Economic Games, I: Theory”, Review of Economic Studies, 53, 1-26.
[9] Davidson, C. and R. Deneckere, (1986), “Long-Run Competition in Capacity, Short-
Run Competition in Price, and the Cournot Model,” RAND Journal of Economics,
17, 404-415.
[10] Deneckere, R. and D. Kovenock, (1992), “Price Leadership,” Review of Economic
Studies, 59, 143-162.
[11] Dixon, H., (1990), “Bertrand-Edgeworth Equilibria when Firms Avoid Turning Cus-
tomers Away,” The Journal of Industrial Economics, 39, 131-146.
[12] Dixon, H., (1987), “Approximate Bertrand Equilibria in a Replicated Industry,”
Review of Economic Studies, 54, 47-62.
[13] Friedman, J., (1988),“On the Strategic Importance of Prices versus Quantities,”
Rand Journal of Economics, 19, 607-622
19
[14] Gelman, J. and S. Salop, (1983), “Judo Economics: Capacity Limitation and Coupon
Competition,” Bell Journal of Economics, 14, 315-325.
[15] Hamilton, J.H. and Slutsky, S.M., (1990), ”Endogenous timing in Duopoly Games:
Stackelberg or Cournot Equilibria,” Games and Economic Behavior, 2(1), 29-46.
[16] Holt, C. and D. Scheffman, (1987), “Facilitating Practices: The Effects of Advance
Notice and Best Price Policies,” Rand Journal of Economics, 18, 187-197.
[17] Iwand, T. and D. Rosenbaum, (1991), “Pricing Strategies in Supergames with Ca-
pacity Constraints: Some Evidence from the US Portland Cement Industry,” Inter-
national Journal of Industrial Organization, 9, 497-511.
[18] Kreps, D. and J. Sheinkman, (1983), “Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Com-
petition Yield Cournot Outcomes,” Bell Journal of Economics, 14, 326-337.
[19] Maskin, E., (1986), ”The Existence of Equilibrium with Price Setting Firms”, Amer-
ican Economic Review, 76, 382-386.
[20] Levitan, R. and M. Shubik, (1972), “Price Duopoly and Capacity Constraints,” In-
ternational Economic Review, 13, 111-123.
[21] Osborne, Martin J. and Carolyn Pitchik, ”Price Competition in a Capacity-
Constrained Duopoly”, Journal of Economic Theory 38 (1986), 238—260.
[22] Sorgard, L., (1995), “Judo Economics Reconsidered: Capacity Limitation, Entry and
Collusion,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 15, 349-368.
[23] Vives, X., (1986), “Rationing Rules and Bertrand-Edgeworth Equilibria in Large
Markets,” Economic Letters, 21, 113-116.
20
7. Appendix
The following two Lemmas will prove useful in order to prove Theorem 4
Lemma 1. In a mixed strategy equilibrium to the discounting subgame if µ
i
([p̂, p̂+)) > 0
for any  > 0 and π
i
(p) is right continuous at p = p̂ then the expected profit of the
equilibrium is given by π
i
(p̂).
Proof: i)If µ
i
(p̂) > 0 the proof is trivial, consider the case of µ
i
(p̂) = 0 and suppose
π
i
(p̂) − π∗
i
= C where C < 0 and π∗
i
is the expected payoff of the mixed strategy
equilibrium. Since µ
i
((p̂, p̂+)) > 0 for any  > 0 it must be the case that π
i
(p̂) = π∗
i
for some p ∈ (p̂, p̂+ ) .
On the other hand by right continuity of π
i
(p) at p = p̂ we have then that for
any δ > 0, there exists an  > 0 s.t. 0 < p̂− p <  implies |π
i
(p̂)− π
i
(p)| < δ. Take
δ = C
2
and we reach a contradiction with |π
i
(p)− π∗
i
| = C.

Lemma 2. In a mixed strategy equilibrium to the discounting subgame if firm i has
positive measure at a price p̂, P (k
1
+k
2
) < p̂ ≤ pL
i
then µ
j
([p̂, p̂+ ]) = 0 for small enough
 > 0.
Proof: For any p < p̂ we may write the expected profits expression as
π
j
(p) = (µ
i
((p, p)) + µ
i
([p, pR]))min(k
j
,D(p))p+∫
[0,p̂]−[p,p̂]
R(p, z, k
i
)dµ
i
(z) + µ
i
(p)D(p)p
k
j
k
1
+ k
2
Taking limits from the left
lim
p→¯pˆ
π
j
(p) = µ
i
([p̂, p0])min(k
j
, D(p̂))p̂+
∫
[0,p̂)
R(p̂, z, k
i
)dµ
i
(z)
Consider now the expected profit function when p > p̂
π
j
(p) = (µ
i
([p, p0])− µ
i
([p̂, p]))min(k
j
,D(p))p+∫
[0,p̂]
⋃
(p̂,p)
R(p, z, k
i
)dµ
i
(z) + µ
i
(p)D(p)p
k
j
k
1
+ k
2
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Taking limits from the right
lim
p→
+
p
π
j
(p) = µ
i
((p̂, p0])min(k
−i
, D(p))p+
∫
[0,p̂]
R(p̂, z, k
i
)dµ
i
(z)
On the other hand we have that
π
j
(p̂) = µ
i
((p̂, p0])min(k
−i
,D(p̂))p̂+
∫
[0,p̂)
R(p̂, z, k
i
)dµ
i
(z) + µ
i
(p̂)D(p̂)p̂
k
j
k
1
+ k
2
We have then
π
j
(p̂)− lim
p→¯pˆ
π
j
(p) = µ
i
(p̂)(D(p̂)
k
j
k
1
+ k
2
−min(k
j
,D(p̂)))p̂
Note that since p̂ > P (k
1
+ k
2
) then D(p̂) kj
k
1
+k
2
< min(k
j
, D(p̂)). Thus π
j
(p̂) −
lim
p→¯pˆ
π
j
(p) < 0 which implies there exists a p < p̂ that gives firm j higher expected
profits than p̂ thus µ
j
(p̂) = 0.
On the other hand we have
π
j
(p̂)− lim
p→
+
p̂
π
j
(p) = µ
j
(p̂)(D(p̂)
k
j
k
1
+ k
2
−R(p̂, p̂, k
i
))p̂
Note that since p > P (k
1
+k
2
) and by property (4) of the residual demand function
D(p̂)
k
j
k
1
+k
2
− R(p̂, p̂, k
i
) > 0. Thus π
j
(p̂) − lim
p→
+
p̂
π
j
(p̂) > 0 which implies that
there exists an  > 0 such that π
−i
(p) < π
−i
(p̂) for p ∈ (p̂, p̂ + ]. This implies
µ
j
((p̂, p̂+ ]) = 0.

Proof: [Proof of Theorem 4-i] Suppose firms have different lower bounds for their
support, thus pd
i
< pd
j
.
i) Consider the case pD
j
≤ pM
i
(note that this implies pM
i
> 0 since pd
i
≥ 0),
we have then that pure strategy λpd
i
+ (1− λ)pd
j
for any 0 < λ < 0 dominates any
strategy in [pd
i
, λpd
i
+(1− λ)pd
j
). On the other hand by definition of support we have
that µ
i
([pd
i
, pd
i
+ )) > 0 for any  > 0. This implies that pd = pL
i
and µ
i
(pL
i
) = 1. It
must then be the case that
min(k
i
, D(pL
i
))pL
i
≤ max
p
′
∈[p
L
i
,p
L
j
]
R(p′, pL
i
, k
i
)p′
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and thus firm jmaximizes its profits by playing argmax
p
′
∈[p
L
i
,p
L
j
]
R(p′, pL
i
, k
i
)p′ this
contradicts the assumption that firms are playing nondegenerate mixed strategies
in equilibrium.
ii) Suppose pd
j
> pM
i
then pM
i
dominates any other price for firm i. Thus the best
response by firm i involves playing a pure strategy pd
i
= min(pM
i
, pL
i
). If pd
i
= pL
i
by
the previous argument firm j must be playing the pure strategy argmax
p
′
∈[p
L
i
,p
L
j
]
R(p′, pL
i
, k
i
)p′.
If on the other hand pd
i
= pM
i
firm j faces a residual demand of zero and the best
response of firm j must involve undercutting pd
i
which contradicts pd
i
< pd
j
.

Proof: [Proof of Theorem 4-ii] By definition of support it must be the case that
µ
i
([pd, pd + )) > 0 for any  > 0. We will now prove right continuity of the firms
expected profit function at pd and apply Lemma 1 to obtain the desired result.
Let us consider the expected profits for a particular firm i for a particular strategy
p > pd
π
i
(p) = µ
j
((p, p0))min(k
i
, D(p))p+
∫
{p
D
}
⋃
(p
D
,p)
R(p, z, k
j
)pdµ
j
(z)+
µ
j
(p)D(p)p
k
i
k
1
+ k
2
Taking the limit from the right
lim
p→¯p
D
π
i
(p) = µ
j
((pd, p0))min(k
i
, D(pd))pd +
∫
p
D
R(pd, z, k
j
)pddµ
j
(z) =
µ
j
((pd, p0))min(k
i
,D(pd))pd + µ
j
(pd)R(pd, pd, k
−i
)pd
Suppose now that pd = P (k
1
+ k
2
), then R(pd, pd, k
j
)pd = k
i
P (k
1
+ k
2
), and
lim
p→¯P (k
1
+k
2
)
π
i
(p) = k
i
P (k
1
+ k
2
). Note that π
i
(P (k
1
+ k
2
)) = k
i
P (k
1
+ k
2
). We
have then proven right continuity of the expected profit function of firm i when
pd = P (k
1
+ k
2
).
Suppose on the other hand pd > P (k
1
+ k
2
). We will first note that µ
i
(pd) = 0
for i ∈ {1, 2}, if this were not the case for some i, then by Lemma 2 we would have
µ
j
([pd, pd + )) = 0 for some  > 0, which contradicts the fact that pd is in the
support of firm j. We have then
lim
p→¯p
D
π
i
(p) = µ
−i
((pd, p0))min(k
i
,D(pd))pd = min(k
i
, D(pd))pd
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Proof: [Proof or Theorem 4-iii] Let us define p¯ = max(p¯
1
, p¯
2
). Suppose µ
i
(p¯) > 0 for
some i, by Lemma 2 µ
j
(p¯) = 0 and thus h = i. Suppose µ
i
(p¯) = 0 for both i. It
must be the case that p¯ = p¯
i
for some i, we then have h = i.

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